This is story of the 100+ American free-market economists recruited by the tobacco industry. It was written in 2014-2015 but due to circumstances never finished. The story is too important to ignoreso I'm presenting the draft written back then. Feedback / new insights welcome.
Welcome to the first post of many.
Summary
The
tobacco industry used a series of scientists in so-called ‘truth squads’ to
deny the harmfulness of second-hand smoking.
Lesser
known is how the industry handed out millions
of dollars to a secret network of
over 100 American economics professors, known as the "economists
network".
 |
| Robert D. Tollison (1942-2016) |
The aim
of the network was preventing the government imposing higher excise taxes on
tobacco to cover social costs related to smoking. The economists were hired to spread economic doubt on the
effectiveness of social cost related actions by the government.
The
network, lead by George Mason University (GMU) professor Robert D. Tollison (1942-2016) and tobacco consultant James Savarese (ca 1947 - 2009), engaged in different
activities.
This
series of blogposts will prove that the economists were :
-
Targeting the media in well organized op-ed
campaigns.
All
op-eds had to be cleared by the tobacco industry's lawyers before publication
The
economists earned up to $3,000 per op-ed they managed to get published in
newspapers
-
Testifying at political hearings
The
economists earned up to $10.000 per hearing
Some
economists defended arguments they knew were flawed
-
Producing 'scientific' papers
that were approved by the tobacco industry.
The
economists earned up to $40.000 per scientific paper they published
Some
economists "authored" reports actually written by the tobacco
industry
Every
single scientific paper was cleared and/or corrected by the tobacco industry's
lawyers
-
Producing pro-tobacco books
Robert
D. Tollison and Richard E. Wagner wrote/edited at least 5 pro-tobacco books
The
books were promoted by well organized media-tours
funded by the industry all over the USA.
The authors received media training organized by the tobacco lobby on how to deal with tricky questions
The authors received media training organized by the tobacco lobby on how to deal with tricky questions
Positive book
review were sent to newspapers by other members of the network
The
economists consistently "forgot" to mention they were being paid by the
Tobacco Institute or tobacco companies.
While
many of the individual points discussed below are known in isolation this paper
tries to provide a complete and much needed overview of the activities of the
network. It expands on the partial overview
provided by Anne Landman, Daniel K. Cortese and Stanton Glantz in their paper Tobacco industry sociological programs toinfluence public beliefs about smoking
Just like any
other industry, the tobacco industry wants to make a profit, therefore it wants
the public to smoke. It is as simple as that. Government decisions that may
result in lower profits are regarded as unwanted and will be attacked.
The Tobacco Institute, Inc. was a trade group founded in 1958 by the
American tobacco industry and that employed around 70 lobbyists. It was
dissolved as part of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement because many of its activities were illegal. As
a part of the settlement, the Tobacco Institute's internal documents have been
placed online in the Legacy Tobacco Documents Libraryhttps://www.industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/.
Since the
1970's, federal, state and local American governments have been imposing more
and more excise taxes on tobacco products. The industry was not very
pleased. Regional Philip Morris director Page
H. Sutherland wrote in 1977
If North Carolina increases the state cigarette tax above the present level, it would surely precipitate a domino effect around the country, causing most state tax rates to go up at least a proportionate amount. This could well cause a resultant decline in domestic sales
A 1979 report
by the US Surgeon General concluded passive smoke, or Environmental Tobacco Smoke (ETS) exposure should be considered aseparate scientific issue from active smoking. In
January 1993, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released the report Respiratory Health Effects of PassiveSmoking: Lung Cancer and Other Disorders attributing at least 3.000 annual
US lung-cancer deaths to ETS exposure
The negative
health effects of tobacco have been known since the 1950's.
With some delay the public also became aware that smoking kills and later the
public became aware that smoking is not just harmful for the smoker but also
for those in the smoker's environment. In 1978, the Roper Organization Inc.'s
survey on public attitudes on environmental tobacco smoke noticed
Nearly six out of ten believe that smoking is hazardous to the non-smoker's health, up sharply over the last four years. More than two-thirds of non-smokers believe it, nearly half of all smokers believe it. This we see as the most dangerous development to the viability of the tobacco industry that has yet occurred
ETS caused a serious problem for the industry, because
harm to nearby non-smokers incents governments to take action against smoking
in public places. William Murray (vice
chairman of the board of Philip Morris) called ETS the single most important challenge we currently
face because Murray realized that
ETS is the driving force behind smoking restrictions in the workplace, on airlines and other forms of public transportation, and in virtually all areas offering public access. If present trends continue, smokers will have fewer and fewer opportunities to enjoy a cigarette. This will have a very direct and major impact on consumption
In 1994, Philip Morris noted
Smoking bans are the biggest challenge we have ever faced. Quit rate goes from 5% to 21% when smokers work in non-smoking environments
ETS leads to smoking related illnesses by
non-smokers, adding to the economic losses because smokers themselves are ill
more often, with more absenteeism at work and higher health care costs. It is
possible to put a price tag on these costs, so called social (economic) costs.
Anti-smoking groups used social cost as an
additional argument to call for more tobacco regulations. The issue put the
tobacco industry under a great deal of stress: if smoking causes a loss for an
entire society, a loss that can be calculated in hard dollars, it will be an
incentive for regulations, taxes to compensate those costs, or even smoking
bans.
This paper explores the industry's answer to the
social cost problem, creation of a refined lobbying strategy to halt new
regulations and taxes.
The tobacco industry set up a clandestine network of free market economists who claimed to be independent academics workings on the economics of social coast and tax-issues. In reality they were being organized and paid by the tobacco industry.
In the next blogpost we'll first explore *why" the tobacco industry set up an economists network.
