The corrupted tobacco economist network Part 53 - Tim Hyde's cunning plan

Overview of previous posts here

Tim Hyde of R.J. Reynolds wrote a very long key document on how to blend the tobacco message into a broader range of political arguments, like 'freedom of choice'. It is a few pages long, but interesting from A to Z so I'm copying the whole document. 

Notice how much he respects his allies. (FC = Field Coördinators)

Just like with the recruitment of the social cost economists, the idea was to direct the existing bias of people towards viewpoints beneficial for the industry

In hindsight, we can see how much of Hyde's plan has been executed on the right side of the political spectrum. By using free market think tanks, serving as an ideological basis for the Republican Party, huge parts of the right wing succumbed to the ideological influence of a message created by corporate lobbyists, thereby effectively changing society's view.

Tim Hyde's cunning plan is not the only document in the LTDL hinting the industry deliberately tried to mix tobacco and freedom in one big blurry message.

Whether the industry started working with the think tanks for the Machiavellian reasons Tim Hyde had in mind, or just for financial reasons is not certain. The think tanks opposed taxes anyway, and with financial aid from the tobacco (and other industries) they would start to write numerous free market reports, papers, etc.

In the 1980's the Tobacco Institute spent much money sending the economists to economics conferences. Even though the tobacco economists' sessions were only attended by an average of 20-25 people, the economists were paid for years to keep presenting their work at these meetings. Savarese explicitly wrote that the aim was to "plant a seed": they hoped other economists would start copying the message, without realizing it was a tobacco message. When googling for the economists, one indeed can see the "academic output" quite often were often cited in scientific papers by economists not paid by the industry. In other words: the plan worked.

By the 1990's the industry knew which think tanks were willing to work with them, a contrast with 1988 when the industry was still looking who to work with. In the 1980's there already were plenty of contacts, but it appears that then think tanks still were seen as an external factor the industry needed to lobby

(...)

In the 1990's the industry would have much closer contact with the think tanks, and the industry hired consultants whose only job was to gain a foot in the door at these think tanks.

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 5 of many

Overview of the previous chapters here

Turning social cost into a lobbying-strategy

It is clear the industry simply researched the social cost issue to be able to create an instrument for lobbying. When the research of their consultants was finished, the next step for the industry was to decide which research could be used in its lobbying-strategy. This strategy was written down in the TI Cigarette Excise Tax Plan, subject of the blogpost after this one.

As seen in previous post, in 1979 and 1980 the industry started researching several different possible arguments (philosophical, anthropological, economical, . . .) to adress the social cost issue. 

By 1984 the industry seems to have abandoned the idea of using anthropological arguments to deny tobacco had a real social cost. Nor would the industry use 'philosophical' arguments to attack "social cost" as a valid scientific tool, simply because this kind of philosophical thinking is hard to turn into facile and misleading arguments. The turning point seems to have been a workshop held in 1984 where the different social cost researchers presented their conclusions. Tobacco employee Ed Battison attended the workshop and concluded:

Some of these points present a structure for defense of prosmoking views that are applicable to legislative hearings and lobbying during 1985 and 1986.

After the workshop most of the non-economic research must have been considered a dead end, because it did not appear in the TI Cigarette Excise Tax Plan. Even the economic arguments were basically narrowed down to attacks on excise taxes by claiming they were not a valid tool to translate the social costs of tobacco, or claiming there was no social cost at all. The industry would also use the argument that taxes harmed the economy, so that addressing social cost by imposing excise taxes would prove to be ineffective.

The outcome of the research done by the extreme free-market researchers fitted their worldview, as Battison's summary illustrates:

Douglas J. Den Uyl 

He sees San Francisco ordinance as unwarranted and an infringement on individual liberty. Smokers should have more than zero rights in public buildings. He also finds W.H.O. philosophy to be rife with paternalism and social engineering.

William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison (two future members of the economists network):

a law like the San Francisco ordinance has no real case for intervention. Nonsmokers benefit at the expense of smokers, who lose their rights as nonsmokers' gain.

                                               

Peter Berger (Battison's emphasis):

identifies antismoking movement—ASH, GASP as volunteer operations of activists, and the bureaucracy as government agencies like O.S.&H. who are cautious but feel that the scientific evidence is undeniable and definitive. They are paternalistic to smokers and believe that smokers do not know what is good or bad for them.

James M.Buchanan:

argues compellingly for common sense in public policy on smoking. If each one succeeds in banning all of one's dislikes, everyone will be worse off. Self respect and tolerance are needed.

Robert Tollison:

Tollison concludes that antismoking movement can lead to restricting other forms of behavior as well, and could result in totally regulated society.

The industry did not drop all the non-economic arguments completely after the workshop and they still appeared in the 1985 book Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment, edited by Tollison. But the decision to produce the book was made in 1983 and the industry probably did not want to abort the ongoing writing as it might offend the authors/allies. It is not unlikely the industry still hoped in the future it might be able to use (at least some of) the work of the other consultants.

Sherwin Feinhandler's cultural arguments were further explored but in 1991 Feinhandler received his Dear John letter

Dear Sherwin, 

Many thanks for your letter of the 14th November, outlining the range of work that Social Systems Analysts inc. are involved in (...) Although there was interest in your paper, unfortunately no immediate need for this type of project was foreseen. There is, however, now an awareness of your work and we do have close contacts with a number of your clients who would no doubt be willing to recommend Social Systems Analysts inc. I am sorry not to be of any help at present but I wish you success for the new year and look forward to meeting with you again at future conferences.

Yet Feinhandler would reappear in 1994 through ARISE, a tobacco funded organization telling smoking cannot be too bad because it brings people 'joy'. It seems the industry discovered Feinhandler's arguments could be turned into a lobbying strategy after all. . .

It is not clear what happened with Robert Nozick's argumentation on personal freedom. In the LTDL-documents his name suddenly disappeared. Perhaps the industry simply did not need any further research on the ‘freedom’ argument because it appears the industry was already aware that using people's bias and gut-feelings (like the ‘freedom idea’ of libertarians) would be a good way to recruit new consultants. 

The 1984 strategy document was still looking for a ring leader to set up the social cost consultant network. That all the names circulating were libertarians, was hardly a coincidence. 

Finally, Robert Tollison, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University and James M. Savarese, a consultant, would be asked to create a network of economists working with the industry to fight excise taxes. While the writings of the economists show (at least some of) the economists accepted the existence of a tobacco related social cost, they all objected the practical use of social cost as an instrument to address to tobacco issue. As libertarians, they certainly objected any form of taxes.

In the next post, we'll see how the network of social cost consultants fitted a much broader lobbying strategy written down in the Cigarette Excise Tax Plan.

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 4 of many

Overview of the previous chapters here

The path to the social cost strategy

Ultimately, the goal of the research done by the consultants was to provide ammunition for the tobacco industry facing the social cost issue.

This 1979 memorandum by Ernest Pepples (vice-president of Brown & Williamson)  shows the tobacco industry realised something important

Instead of trying to argue that it is not 90,000 hospital beds which are attributable to cigarettes but only some figure less than 90,000, the better attack is to take the adversary onto higher conceptual ground. It is also important, of course, to identify and critique the errors of the attacking papers and do a solid professional job of exposing the flaws in them.

Even if the tobacco industry would be able to prove science was wrong and smoking 'only' results in 40.000 hospital beds instead of 90.000, it would still imply the industry admitting smoking is harmfull,. This still would be a marketing disaster.

The industry realized this would be a dead end. A different strategy was needed, one that couldn't backfire. 

In 1984, the industry implemented the lobbying strategy it had developed on social cost. But this attack did not appear out of nowhere, and the Tobacco Institute had been working on the subject since at least 1979, the time of the Berman memo. Before launching the lobbying strategy the industry wanted to know which aspects of the broad domain of social cost could be attacked.

The first research on social cost consisted of :

1.     identifying key issues that could move public opinion on the social acceptability and social costs of smoking,

2.     testing possible countermeasures that could alter public opinion in favor of the industry

3.     exploring the feasibility of creating an intensive, long-term, industry-wide effort to improve public opinion and tolerance of smoking

In order to identify key issues suitable for lobbying, the industry hired several consultants, the 1979-memo from above also mentions the head consultants at the time: 

• Robert D. Tollison (Economics)
• Martin Gruber (Finance)
• Sherwin Feinhandler (Anthropology)
• Peter Berger (Sociology)
• Robert Nozick (Philosophy)
• Edward Harris (Political science)

It shows the industry was investigating different scientific fields related to social cost, and had several other scientific fileds in mind like actuarila science, statistics, social psychology, ...

Most of the consultants are known for their strong libertarian viewpoints. It will become clear this is no coincidence.

Tobacco consultant George R. Berman (Philip Morris) wrote a long text in September 1979 explaining why the industry sponsored work in such a variety of scientific domains

When this research is completed we will have a foundation for dealing with the social cost issue. We will have attacked its economic reasoning. We will have looked at the dark side of its philosophy, and related that philosophy to the larger motives of the anti-smoking leadership. We will have explored the social benefits of smoking, and the social costs of smoking restrictions. Hopefully, we will be able to stop this attack before it stops us.

Berman proposed an attack using four themes

1. These social cost concepts are bad economics
2. They do not fit into a philosophy of personal freedom and civil liberty
3. Smoking benefits society and its members in many complex ways
4. Anti-smoking programs and groups are harmful to our society
5. Thus, our project is concerned with both social costs and social values.

Interestingly the four points listed by Berman show he did not simply want an attack on social cost science. There is also a part showing the industry wanted to lobby by focusing on people's 'social values', for example by telling people: 'it is YOUR choice to smoke, and the government should not interfere with your freedom of choice'.
Of course, the industry was well aware smoking :
1) through ETS also affects others, so smoking is not just a matter of personal liberties
2) is not necessarily a personal choice, but is influenced by a cultural factors. Even though we might think we are fully rational individuals and we are the only ones making our decisions, this simply is not true. Our 'free will' is not as free as we want to believe. It has been well documented people's surroundings have an influence on whether someone will start to smoke or not.

While it is possible -at least to some extent- to objectify and measure 'freedom' (it is possible to measure in which countries it is possible to walk on the street wearing a t-shirt with a political slogan, without being jailed), it is also possible to turn 'freedom' into a value-loaded moral component. By using arguments like: 'they are not attacking tobacco, but anti-smoke regulations are oppressing people' or even on a personal level: 'they are not attacking cigarettes, but they are attacking YOU, as a person', these arguments aim for people's underbelly, and that's exactly the subjective emotional part of the message the industry wanted to exploit. Feeding a person's bias is always useful to manipulate them in the desired direction.

Genuine scientific output was not a goal of the tobacco industry's research. As George Berman made clear in 1979, the research had no other purpose than to provide material for lobbying:

The economists working on this project are first developing a "layman's guide" to social cost/benefit analysis. The attacks against us claim to use economics to justify further action. The Layman's guide will address three key questions.

This passage makes clear the research should result in ‘easy’ arguments the industry could use when talking with, for example, legislators. Several LTDL documents show the industry complained the output of the economic consultants was too technical and therefore not suited to translate into popular arguments. This does not mean the industry did not want the research to have a 'scientific' side, because it also was beneficial for the industry to have reports with academic credibility proclaiming that the idea of using social cost was flawed. This is explained in the anonymous document from 1980 titled Goals of the social costs/social values project. The final goal though always was to use the 'science' as a ground for lobbying.

The objective of these two projects [the first social costs reports] is to generate papers relevant to the social cost of smoking which can then be used as references in direct confrontation with the issue. Through a sequence of steps, the favorable conclusions of these papers can be infused into professional journals and then into the popular press.

The 'scientific' output also had the advantage it could be used to attract more scientists, and indeed the economists later on would appear at conferences (this will be illustrated in another chapter), trying to convince their peers that using social costs is flawed. Indeed, googling shows that other academics started quoting the work of the tobacco economists in genuine academic papers.

Berman gives some examples of what the industry wanted as output from the economists. The economists should deny the mere existence of a tobacco related social costs, e.g. by denying medical expenses due to smoking are actually social costs. Berman wrote (emphasis added):

There may be a few cases where smoking creates uncompensated costs for non-smokers. But the economists are quite certain that most of the alleged medical expenses do not qualify as social costs. And the much larger charges of absenteeism and lost productivity are not social costs at all.

Berman concluded

It can be shown that my absence from work does not cost you anything

Berman does not deny smoking will lead to higher absenteeism.

Berman is drawing the 'personal freedom' card here, but his argument is nonsense: absence from work does affect others, including the employers of the smoker. Their employees’ absence means they are less productive, or exactly the thing making the employer money. Moreover, fellow employees who must cover for the smoker are not be able to do their own work.

Berman's text also explains why the Tobacco Institute consulted the philosopher Robert Nozick

Unfortunately, the use of social economics is often a disguise for expressing a particular political philosophy. Thus, if a worker is absent because of illness allegedly related to smoking, there is said to be a social cost. But no one seems to consider skiing accidents as a social cost, and certainly not the time spent on holiday. So whether absenteeism is a social cost seems to depend on how you feel about the cause! This is an area of philosophy, where we need to look at what people have a right to do to themselves and to each other

(...)

The philosopher looks at some subjects which are important, but very difficult for the economist to deal with. For example, there is a value to having a government which does not interfere with personal behavior and freedom of choice . If such restrictions are being considered, for "social cost" reasons, the loss of these freedoms must be counted as part of the cost of the government policy

Again, Berman takes some illogical steps, like

Lost working time is a social cost only if my labor belongs to the state. Then, of course, society has a right to protect its property, without much regard for what that "property" would prefer.

Lost working time affects private market employers. If all employees are on sick leave, not much profit will be made. Smoking related illnesses affect the sick person’s family. The illness could mean that the smoker's partner must rearrange schedules to pick up the kids from school, possibly causing employment problems or other emotional stress. The smoker’s illness has a social cost. Berman's logic is deeply flawed.

Nevertheless, Berman tries to play the card of personal freedom

But if I am restricted from smoking because it bothers someone else, I have lost my benefits, that is, a cost has been placed on me . Don't those who benefit from this restriction owe me compensation for my lost benefits? Or do anti-smokers have exclusive ownership of the air rights in a public place? As another philosopher put the matter recently, there is a limit to the extent we are mortgaged to one another.

Here we come to one of the libertarian ideology's core points: freedom, freedom, freedom. No, it is not a coincidence the tobacco industry hired a libertarian philosopher.

If social cost/benefit analysis itself implies a concern for people, the issue comes down to a quote from dr. Nozick's book on libertarian philosophy :

Why not interfere with someone else's shaping of his own life? Because anyone might come up with the pattern of life you wish to adopt. Therefore, it is in your own self-interest to allow another to pursue his conception of life as he sees it. You may learn from his example.

As mentioned above, tobacco does not affect only the smoker. Berman had poor reasoning skills, or the industry was aware that in the search for allies, they should try to feed libertarians the things they wanted to hear.

The use of a cultural anthropologist also is explained by Berman:

Sherwin Feinhandler is a cultural anthropologist who has examined reports on the social role of smoking in over 180 different cultures. As a result of these studies, he is convinced that smoking provides certain universal benefits, although they may appear in different forms from time to time and in different societies. Dr. Feinhandler's basic position is that smoking enables people to function better in society, reduces social frictions. He also believes that many anti-smoking programs and restrictions increase social tension.

With the help of the work done by the consultants, the Tobacco Institute was prepared to develop a lobbying strategy. Berman suggested six counter measurements (they would be altered in the final strategy from 1984). Berman concludes

If we use these countermeasures wisely, we can sharply reduce, or eliminate, social cost as an issue in the social acceptability of smoking

It is clear the industry simply researched the social cost issue to be able to create an instrument for lobbying. When the research of their consultants was finished, the next step for the industry was to decide which research could be used in its lobbying-strategy.

(Ab)using libertarians as useful idiots

Suppose you're a tobacco lobbyist and you want to attack new anti-smoking laws. How to reach your goal ?

Being a lobbyist for the tobacco industry, it would be a bad idea trying to reach the public by directly contacting the media, as you'll quickly be outed as nothing but an industry's spokesman. Lobbyists need other ways to spread their message. By the late 1970's tobacco lobbyists had a problem though: even though the industry created lots of pseudoscientific documents trying to spread doubt tobacco really causes cancer, the public started to be well aware smoking causes lung-cancer. Trying to attack the science wasn't enough to undermine anti-tobacco laws.

A new strategy was needed. 

The industry wrote:

The only way that the right to smoke can be preserved is to link it up with the freedom of lifestyle position, and with the broader libertarian critique of 'health fascism' and the paternalism and authoritarianism of the medical establishment. Our 'special interest' can only be viably defended as part and parcel of broader coalition. We have to shift the focus of the debate from the enemy's strong ground--health--to our strong ground--freedom of choice and individual liberty.

The only thing tobacco lobbyists needed to do to spread this message was redirecting the bias of libertarians, and changing the libertarian hatred against "regulations" into a hatred against "regulations against smoking". Try opening any random libertarian website and the word 'freedom' will pop up everywhere. To kill anti-smoking laws, tobacco lobbyists started spreading the message in libertarian circles that laws against tobacco were undermining personal freedom. 

To spread the tobacco lobby's message of anti-tobacco laws being an attack on personal freedom, lobbyists needed to get in contact with libertarians stupid enough to buy this message. Using their bias, tobacco lobbyists' objective was turning libertarians into useful idiots, lobbying for the tobacco industry. Without the libertarians even realizing.

This document in the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library illustrates how lobbyists selected their targets:

Private & Confidential

ACADEMIC CONTACT LIST

Professor DAVID MARSLAND

(...)

An ex-member of the Labour Party, a founder member of the S .D .P., and the recipient of the first Thatcher Award, David Marsland is now an out-standing free market sociologist at the West London Institute.

Author of many books, covering issues as diverse as education, health, business and the welfare state, Marsland is a hard-core rebel against the 'health-fascist' establishment. A keen smoker with a hatred of the welfare state, Marsland is an affable and well respected academic who is open to private work and easy to approach.

Have no hesitation mentioning my name.

Professor ANTHONY FLEW

EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, READING UNIVERSITY

(...)

One of the most prolific and controversial philosophers of his generation, Professor Anthony Flew will go down in history as one of the most outstanding Conservative thinkers of the twentieth century.

Hated by the left, Flew is an avowed anti-statist who is totally opposed to the welfare establishment with all its "modern trendy ideas". Aware that life, and the act of being human, inevitably involves risk, Flew would be a sound friend in the battle against the anti-smoking lobby.

He knows Chris.

Dr.  BILL THOMPSON

SOCIOLOGY LECTURER, READING UNIVERSITY

(...)

An ex-Anarcho-Socialist turned Free Market Libertarian, Bill is a fascinating, young and dynamic lecturer who teaches the Sociology of Morality.

Specialising in such subjects as Society and Pornography, Moral Panics and the Sociology of Belief Systems, Bill is a radical thinker opposed to state intervention - especially on issues of personal morality . A smoker himself, he is ideologically sympathetic to the defence of smoker's rights. Mention my name.

Dr. CHRISTIE DAVIES

HEAD OF SOCIOLOGY, READING UNIVERSITY

(...)

Christie Davis is one of the most senior and well respected right-wing sociologists in the UK. Although he has a broad range of academic interests, he specialises in the sociology of humour and contemporary criminology.

A radical free marketeer he carries sound ideological baggage when it comes issues of risk and personal freedom.

Dr . NIGEL ASHFORD 

SENIOR LECTURER IN POLITICS, STAFFORDSHIRE UNIVERSITY

(...)

Although a hard-core Libertarian activist since his days in Conservative Students, Ashford is nevertheless an eclectic thinker. An ardent free marketeer, he is also unusually an overt proEuropean.

A member of the British Political Science Association, he is a well connected politics lecturer, who is sympathetic to the paradigm of personal liberty.

Professor DAVID GLADSTONE

PROFESSOR OF SOCIAL POLICY, BRISTOL UNIVERSITY

(...)

An outstanding, charismatic and charming public speaker, Davids Gladstone's primary interest is the growth of the welfare state) during the twentieth century . A socially well connected direct descendant of Prime Minister Gladstone, he is sound on the subject of the nanny state, and at one with the Libertarian right on issues of personal freedom.

A very much under used asset on our side - mention, me on introduction.

JIM BOURLET 
LECTURER IN ECONOMICS, LONDON GUILDHALL UNIVERSITY

(...)

A classical liberal in economic and political outlook, Bourlet is a rather quiet and largely unknown academic who has all the right political instincts .

He would be perfect as a 'name' to front projects. Mention me on introduction.

Dr. DENIS O'KEEFFE 

SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION LECTURER, UNIVERSITY OF WORTH LONDON

(...)
Although O'Keeffe claims he is a Libertarian, he is more accurately described as a liberal-Conservative . Primarily interested in education and the welfare state, he is a superb writer always willing to undertake projects for private business interests.

With a number of close political contacts in parliament, and particularly the House of Lords, O'Keeffe is a well placed academic with an air of authority . From time to time he appears on TV and always performs well Mention me.

Dr. STEVEN DAVIES

SENIOR LECTURER IN HISTORY, MANCHESTER METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY .

(...)

A young, but already prolific writer with a superb style, Davies is best described as Britain's foremost Libertarian Historian.

Sound on all economic, social and political issues, his only weakness is that his manner is not particularly well suited for the media . Nevertheless, is a charming man who is always approachable. Mention my name on introduction.

.

SEAN GABB
PART-TIME LECTURER AT A NUMBER OF LONDON UNIVERSITIES SPECIALISING IN HISTORY, LAW, ECONOMIC HISTORY AND POLITICS 

(...)

An academic genius, Gabb is a Libertarian Conservative who has accidentally ended up being born 200 hundred too years latet A character best suited for the Reform Club around 1780 he has an eccentric and endearing manner - and a rapier brain.

A former member of the Lord Chancellor's Department at the Home Office and a special adviser to the Slovak Prime Minister, Gabb is totally sound on matters of personal freedom and is an outstanding candidate to ghost academic material. Mention me.

WALTER ALLAN 
EX-EDITOR OF ECONOMICS AT MACMILLAN, EX-EDITOR AT THE INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND CURRENTLY A LECTURER AT A NUMBER OF LONDON UNIVERSITIES

(...)

With a sound political outlook and a superb knowledge of economics, Allan is always interested in private commissions which demand a robust defence of the principles of liberty.

A man who "loves to lunch", he is a great networker and has a truly unbelievable range of useful contacts for almost every occasion and operation imaginable.

Mention me.

A quick check learns how succesful the tactic of the industry was: 

Anthony Flew, Bill Thompson, Dennis O'Keeffe, Sean Gabb, Christie Davies & Steven Davies all became active in the Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco, a fake grassroots organisation set up by the tobacco industry.

Sean Gabb describes how he became interested in the subject tobacco:

My interest in tobacco, and in all the news regarding it, stems almost entirely from libertarian principle. I believe that people should have the right to do with themselves as they will, regardless of any possible harm to them.

Feeding their bias, the tobacco industry managed to turn no less than 6 of the 11 libertarians above into useful idiots.