The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 6 of many

overview of previous posts here

An operational social cost strategy

While still researching the social cost issue, the industry already started planning how to implement the "counterattack". In 1983, the first communications plan emerged, in 1984 a full excise tax plan.

In 1983 a prelimanary draft communication plan emerged. It is an important step toward the industry setting up a secret network of economists. The industry wanted  

Several lobbying-programs were selected  like p.ex. a "youth program" . For this series blogseries following domain matters

The suggested tactics included:

(...)

The goal to recruit economists in every state may be a result of an idea launched in 1983 by Brown & Williamson

No matter where they got the idea, by 1984 the Tobacco Institute wanted to set up a network of economic consultants, shown by the first draft of their full-grown Cigarette Excise Tax Plan. It is 109 pages long and gives a brilliant insight on how the industry operated (titles aside, all emphasis are mine)

Again, the industry selected some domains

The tactics for the business coalition now mentions the economists network

(...)

 (...)

At the time, the budget was still moderate

Thus, at the time (1984) the industry already had the idea to use economists, but the industry was still headhunting. The last page of the Excise Plan is wondering who to hire

Ed Battison from his side was also headhunting, and his report of the 1984 workshop carries an addendum with potential witnesses

-   GLEN LOURY, economist, Northwestern U., belongs to the group, Council For A Black Economic Agenda

-   WALTER WILLIAMS, George Mason U., professor, Center for Study of Public Choice, I.R.E.T. board member, against excise taxes.

-   AMITAI ETZIONI, sociology professor, George Washington U., has written on Role of Self-Discipline; and Education For Mutuality & Civility (in Futurist, 1982); Government Of Laws— Congress Excepted, 1979; Social Science vs Government—Standoff at Policy Gap, 1978 He is likely to be for individual freedom of smokers--ask Fred Panzer.

-   ROBERT D. TOLLISON, economist, George Mason U., Center For Study of Public Choice, has written on tax reform, social costs of the cigarette excise. Disinterest In Deregulation in the American Economic Review, 1984; Economic Regulation, Competitive Government, Specialized Resources; Instead of Regulation--Alternatives to ...; Rent Seeking, A Survey; F.T.C. Since 1970--Economic Regulation & Bureaucratic Behavior, 1982; Rational Choice & The Taxation Of Sin-a Reply by Grain, Deaton, Holcombe, & Tollison in Jour.of Public Econ.,v.16,1981. He is an authority on the economic inefficiency of excise taxes by his study of their higher than expected social costs.

-   RICHARD E. WAGNER, economist Florida State TJ, has written two papers on the irrationality of earmarking cigarette & alcohol excise taxes for Medicare and Medicaid, one for the recent association seminar and one for the TI; among his several books and articles is a recent text on taxation; articles on Government Spending, Trends and Issues by Beck and Wagner in SEJ, 1982; and Wagner's Law, Fiscal Institutions, and Growth of Government in National Tax Journal, v.30, 1977; he would testify against earmarking excises for public medical programs.

-   D.R LEE, George Mason U., Rent-Seeking & Its Implication for Pollution Taxation in SEJ, v.51, 1984; the Economics of Enforcing Pollution Taxation in Journal of Envir. Sc. & Manag., v.11,1984; Tax Rate & Tax Revenues In Political Equilibrium, by Buchanan & Lee, 1982; he is similar in his views and expertise to Tollison who is a colleague, but he is more inclined to take the inefficiency argument only and is a specialist in pollution problems.

-   PETER BLAU, social psychologist, has testified in the 1970's and has written Behavioral Sociology Or Behavioral Sociology in the American Sociologist, 1981; he is apparently for freedom of choice. 

-   TERRY ANDERSON, economics professor at Montana State IK, has written Who Cares About Efficiency in Cato Journal, 1982; he has seen limited service in helping state issues xn WA state. 

-   P. L. BERGER, Boston U., sociologist, has written among other articles, Democracy For Everyone in Commentary, vol.76, 1983. He is apparently for freedom from individual social restrictions. 

-   TED STERLING, Simon Fraser U., has written extensively as a contrarian. Among these are: Filtering Information About Occupation, Smoking & Disease in Jour. of Chronic Disease, 1984; Does Smoking Kill Workers Or Working Kill Smokers?—mutual relationship among smoking, occupation, and respiratory disease in International Journal' of Health Services, vol.8, 1978; Smoking & Cancer in American Journal of Public Health, vol.66, 1976; Critical Reassessment of Evidence Bearing On Smoking As a Cause of Lung Cancer, American Journal of Public Health, vol. 65, 1975; Review Of Claim That Excess Morbidity & Disability Can Be Ascribed to Smoking (Rejoinder) in Journal of American Statistical Assoc., vol. 68, 1973.

Other persons have been identified, but at present, it is not known clearly what their positions on the issues or on testimony are.

Battison's document makes clear that the industry was searching amongst the people already holding views that suited the industry’s purposes, and this indeed would become key in setting up the network: directing people's biases towards the tobacco industry’s ends.

Robert Tollison eventually would become a key person in setting up the social cost consultants. Other future members of the network of economists already mentioned on these lists are Thomas Borcherding, Fred McChesney, James Heins, David Klingaman, Richard Wagner, Walter Williams, Terry Anderson, Dwight R. Lee and S. Charles Maurice.

Did the industry know these guys probably would be corrupt? Not very likely. They knew they were libertarians, and that's why they were selected.

Refining the social cost strategy

The 1984 Tobacco Institute's Excise Tax Plan became more concrete in the version of July 11, 1984. 

Even though it would only be in the 1990's that the tobacco industry launched a full scale attack on EPA, far beyond tobacco related topics, hoping the public would start to have a general mistrust in science, the seeds of this action plan are already in the document of 1984.

The document show the industry was willing to pay external partners to work on topics not relevant for the tobacco industry, as long as those external partners also engaged in activities beneficial for the industry.

(...)

The work of the economists is mentioned:

And

and

In other words, setting up the economists network was part of well-defined strategy. And the goal was not to produce academic material.

It is clear the industry did not contact just any economist though. It is equally clear the recruited economists knew they would be working with the Tobacco Institute as this was explicitly mentioned to them (the underlining is in the original 1987 memorandum)

The first network activities appear to date from 1985, or two years before the note above was written. Several LTDL documents suggest the tobacco industry had difficulties finding an economist in every state and it was only in 1987 that Savarese completed the lists. As the industry dumped economists (see further), throughout the existence of the network new economists were recruited

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 5 of many

Overview of the previous chapters here

Turning social cost into a lobbying-strategy

It is clear the industry simply researched the social cost issue to be able to create an instrument for lobbying. When the research of their consultants was finished, the next step for the industry was to decide which research could be used in its lobbying-strategy. This strategy was written down in the TI Cigarette Excise Tax Plan, subject of the blogpost after this one.

As seen in previous post, in 1979 and 1980 the industry started researching several different possible arguments (philosophical, anthropological, economical, . . .) to adress the social cost issue. 

By 1984 the industry seems to have abandoned the idea of using anthropological arguments to deny tobacco had a real social cost. Nor would the industry use 'philosophical' arguments to attack "social cost" as a valid scientific tool, simply because this kind of philosophical thinking is hard to turn into facile and misleading arguments. The turning point seems to have been a workshop held in 1984 where the different social cost researchers presented their conclusions. Tobacco employee Ed Battison attended the workshop and concluded:

Some of these points present a structure for defense of prosmoking views that are applicable to legislative hearings and lobbying during 1985 and 1986.

After the workshop most of the non-economic research must have been considered a dead end, because it did not appear in the TI Cigarette Excise Tax Plan. Even the economic arguments were basically narrowed down to attacks on excise taxes by claiming they were not a valid tool to translate the social costs of tobacco, or claiming there was no social cost at all. The industry would also use the argument that taxes harmed the economy, so that addressing social cost by imposing excise taxes would prove to be ineffective.

The outcome of the research done by the extreme free-market researchers fitted their worldview, as Battison's summary illustrates:

Douglas J. Den Uyl 

He sees San Francisco ordinance as unwarranted and an infringement on individual liberty. Smokers should have more than zero rights in public buildings. He also finds W.H.O. philosophy to be rife with paternalism and social engineering.

William F. Shughart II and Robert D. Tollison (two future members of the economists network):

a law like the San Francisco ordinance has no real case for intervention. Nonsmokers benefit at the expense of smokers, who lose their rights as nonsmokers' gain.

                                               

Peter Berger (Battison's emphasis):

identifies antismoking movement—ASH, GASP as volunteer operations of activists, and the bureaucracy as government agencies like O.S.&H. who are cautious but feel that the scientific evidence is undeniable and definitive. They are paternalistic to smokers and believe that smokers do not know what is good or bad for them.

James M.Buchanan:

argues compellingly for common sense in public policy on smoking. If each one succeeds in banning all of one's dislikes, everyone will be worse off. Self respect and tolerance are needed.

Robert Tollison:

Tollison concludes that antismoking movement can lead to restricting other forms of behavior as well, and could result in totally regulated society.

The industry did not drop all the non-economic arguments completely after the workshop and they still appeared in the 1985 book Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment, edited by Tollison. But the decision to produce the book was made in 1983 and the industry probably did not want to abort the ongoing writing as it might offend the authors/allies. It is not unlikely the industry still hoped in the future it might be able to use (at least some of) the work of the other consultants.

Sherwin Feinhandler's cultural arguments were further explored but in 1991 Feinhandler received his Dear John letter

Dear Sherwin, 

Many thanks for your letter of the 14th November, outlining the range of work that Social Systems Analysts inc. are involved in (...) Although there was interest in your paper, unfortunately no immediate need for this type of project was foreseen. There is, however, now an awareness of your work and we do have close contacts with a number of your clients who would no doubt be willing to recommend Social Systems Analysts inc. I am sorry not to be of any help at present but I wish you success for the new year and look forward to meeting with you again at future conferences.

Yet Feinhandler would reappear in 1994 through ARISE, a tobacco funded organization telling smoking cannot be too bad because it brings people 'joy'. It seems the industry discovered Feinhandler's arguments could be turned into a lobbying strategy after all. . .

It is not clear what happened with Robert Nozick's argumentation on personal freedom. In the LTDL-documents his name suddenly disappeared. Perhaps the industry simply did not need any further research on the ‘freedom’ argument because it appears the industry was already aware that using people's bias and gut-feelings (like the ‘freedom idea’ of libertarians) would be a good way to recruit new consultants. 

The 1984 strategy document was still looking for a ring leader to set up the social cost consultant network. That all the names circulating were libertarians, was hardly a coincidence. 

Finally, Robert Tollison, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University and James M. Savarese, a consultant, would be asked to create a network of economists working with the industry to fight excise taxes. While the writings of the economists show (at least some of) the economists accepted the existence of a tobacco related social cost, they all objected the practical use of social cost as an instrument to address to tobacco issue. As libertarians, they certainly objected any form of taxes.

In the next post, we'll see how the network of social cost consultants fitted a much broader lobbying strategy written down in the Cigarette Excise Tax Plan.

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 4 of many

Overview of the previous chapters here

The path to the social cost strategy

Ultimately, the goal of the research done by the consultants was to provide ammunition for the tobacco industry facing the social cost issue.

This 1979 memorandum by Ernest Pepples (vice-president of Brown & Williamson)  shows the tobacco industry realised something important

Instead of trying to argue that it is not 90,000 hospital beds which are attributable to cigarettes but only some figure less than 90,000, the better attack is to take the adversary onto higher conceptual ground. It is also important, of course, to identify and critique the errors of the attacking papers and do a solid professional job of exposing the flaws in them.

Even if the tobacco industry would be able to prove science was wrong and smoking 'only' results in 40.000 hospital beds instead of 90.000, it would still imply the industry admitting smoking is harmfull,. This still would be a marketing disaster.

The industry realized this would be a dead end. A different strategy was needed, one that couldn't backfire. 

In 1984, the industry implemented the lobbying strategy it had developed on social cost. But this attack did not appear out of nowhere, and the Tobacco Institute had been working on the subject since at least 1979, the time of the Berman memo. Before launching the lobbying strategy the industry wanted to know which aspects of the broad domain of social cost could be attacked.

The first research on social cost consisted of :

1.     identifying key issues that could move public opinion on the social acceptability and social costs of smoking,

2.     testing possible countermeasures that could alter public opinion in favor of the industry

3.     exploring the feasibility of creating an intensive, long-term, industry-wide effort to improve public opinion and tolerance of smoking

In order to identify key issues suitable for lobbying, the industry hired several consultants, the 1979-memo from above also mentions the head consultants at the time: 

• Robert D. Tollison (Economics)
• Martin Gruber (Finance)
• Sherwin Feinhandler (Anthropology)
• Peter Berger (Sociology)
• Robert Nozick (Philosophy)
• Edward Harris (Political science)

It shows the industry was investigating different scientific fields related to social cost, and had several other scientific fileds in mind like actuarila science, statistics, social psychology, ...

Most of the consultants are known for their strong libertarian viewpoints. It will become clear this is no coincidence.

Tobacco consultant George R. Berman (Philip Morris) wrote a long text in September 1979 explaining why the industry sponsored work in such a variety of scientific domains

When this research is completed we will have a foundation for dealing with the social cost issue. We will have attacked its economic reasoning. We will have looked at the dark side of its philosophy, and related that philosophy to the larger motives of the anti-smoking leadership. We will have explored the social benefits of smoking, and the social costs of smoking restrictions. Hopefully, we will be able to stop this attack before it stops us.

Berman proposed an attack using four themes

1. These social cost concepts are bad economics
2. They do not fit into a philosophy of personal freedom and civil liberty
3. Smoking benefits society and its members in many complex ways
4. Anti-smoking programs and groups are harmful to our society
5. Thus, our project is concerned with both social costs and social values.

Interestingly the four points listed by Berman show he did not simply want an attack on social cost science. There is also a part showing the industry wanted to lobby by focusing on people's 'social values', for example by telling people: 'it is YOUR choice to smoke, and the government should not interfere with your freedom of choice'.
Of course, the industry was well aware smoking :
1) through ETS also affects others, so smoking is not just a matter of personal liberties
2) is not necessarily a personal choice, but is influenced by a cultural factors. Even though we might think we are fully rational individuals and we are the only ones making our decisions, this simply is not true. Our 'free will' is not as free as we want to believe. It has been well documented people's surroundings have an influence on whether someone will start to smoke or not.

While it is possible -at least to some extent- to objectify and measure 'freedom' (it is possible to measure in which countries it is possible to walk on the street wearing a t-shirt with a political slogan, without being jailed), it is also possible to turn 'freedom' into a value-loaded moral component. By using arguments like: 'they are not attacking tobacco, but anti-smoke regulations are oppressing people' or even on a personal level: 'they are not attacking cigarettes, but they are attacking YOU, as a person', these arguments aim for people's underbelly, and that's exactly the subjective emotional part of the message the industry wanted to exploit. Feeding a person's bias is always useful to manipulate them in the desired direction.

Genuine scientific output was not a goal of the tobacco industry's research. As George Berman made clear in 1979, the research had no other purpose than to provide material for lobbying:

The economists working on this project are first developing a "layman's guide" to social cost/benefit analysis. The attacks against us claim to use economics to justify further action. The Layman's guide will address three key questions.

This passage makes clear the research should result in ‘easy’ arguments the industry could use when talking with, for example, legislators. Several LTDL documents show the industry complained the output of the economic consultants was too technical and therefore not suited to translate into popular arguments. This does not mean the industry did not want the research to have a 'scientific' side, because it also was beneficial for the industry to have reports with academic credibility proclaiming that the idea of using social cost was flawed. This is explained in the anonymous document from 1980 titled Goals of the social costs/social values project. The final goal though always was to use the 'science' as a ground for lobbying.

The objective of these two projects [the first social costs reports] is to generate papers relevant to the social cost of smoking which can then be used as references in direct confrontation with the issue. Through a sequence of steps, the favorable conclusions of these papers can be infused into professional journals and then into the popular press.

The 'scientific' output also had the advantage it could be used to attract more scientists, and indeed the economists later on would appear at conferences (this will be illustrated in another chapter), trying to convince their peers that using social costs is flawed. Indeed, googling shows that other academics started quoting the work of the tobacco economists in genuine academic papers.

Berman gives some examples of what the industry wanted as output from the economists. The economists should deny the mere existence of a tobacco related social costs, e.g. by denying medical expenses due to smoking are actually social costs. Berman wrote (emphasis added):

There may be a few cases where smoking creates uncompensated costs for non-smokers. But the economists are quite certain that most of the alleged medical expenses do not qualify as social costs. And the much larger charges of absenteeism and lost productivity are not social costs at all.

Berman concluded

It can be shown that my absence from work does not cost you anything

Berman does not deny smoking will lead to higher absenteeism.

Berman is drawing the 'personal freedom' card here, but his argument is nonsense: absence from work does affect others, including the employers of the smoker. Their employees’ absence means they are less productive, or exactly the thing making the employer money. Moreover, fellow employees who must cover for the smoker are not be able to do their own work.

Berman's text also explains why the Tobacco Institute consulted the philosopher Robert Nozick

Unfortunately, the use of social economics is often a disguise for expressing a particular political philosophy. Thus, if a worker is absent because of illness allegedly related to smoking, there is said to be a social cost. But no one seems to consider skiing accidents as a social cost, and certainly not the time spent on holiday. So whether absenteeism is a social cost seems to depend on how you feel about the cause! This is an area of philosophy, where we need to look at what people have a right to do to themselves and to each other

(...)

The philosopher looks at some subjects which are important, but very difficult for the economist to deal with. For example, there is a value to having a government which does not interfere with personal behavior and freedom of choice . If such restrictions are being considered, for "social cost" reasons, the loss of these freedoms must be counted as part of the cost of the government policy

Again, Berman takes some illogical steps, like

Lost working time is a social cost only if my labor belongs to the state. Then, of course, society has a right to protect its property, without much regard for what that "property" would prefer.

Lost working time affects private market employers. If all employees are on sick leave, not much profit will be made. Smoking related illnesses affect the sick person’s family. The illness could mean that the smoker's partner must rearrange schedules to pick up the kids from school, possibly causing employment problems or other emotional stress. The smoker’s illness has a social cost. Berman's logic is deeply flawed.

Nevertheless, Berman tries to play the card of personal freedom

But if I am restricted from smoking because it bothers someone else, I have lost my benefits, that is, a cost has been placed on me . Don't those who benefit from this restriction owe me compensation for my lost benefits? Or do anti-smokers have exclusive ownership of the air rights in a public place? As another philosopher put the matter recently, there is a limit to the extent we are mortgaged to one another.

Here we come to one of the libertarian ideology's core points: freedom, freedom, freedom. No, it is not a coincidence the tobacco industry hired a libertarian philosopher.

If social cost/benefit analysis itself implies a concern for people, the issue comes down to a quote from dr. Nozick's book on libertarian philosophy :

Why not interfere with someone else's shaping of his own life? Because anyone might come up with the pattern of life you wish to adopt. Therefore, it is in your own self-interest to allow another to pursue his conception of life as he sees it. You may learn from his example.

As mentioned above, tobacco does not affect only the smoker. Berman had poor reasoning skills, or the industry was aware that in the search for allies, they should try to feed libertarians the things they wanted to hear.

The use of a cultural anthropologist also is explained by Berman:

Sherwin Feinhandler is a cultural anthropologist who has examined reports on the social role of smoking in over 180 different cultures. As a result of these studies, he is convinced that smoking provides certain universal benefits, although they may appear in different forms from time to time and in different societies. Dr. Feinhandler's basic position is that smoking enables people to function better in society, reduces social frictions. He also believes that many anti-smoking programs and restrictions increase social tension.

With the help of the work done by the consultants, the Tobacco Institute was prepared to develop a lobbying strategy. Berman suggested six counter measurements (they would be altered in the final strategy from 1984). Berman concludes

If we use these countermeasures wisely, we can sharply reduce, or eliminate, social cost as an issue in the social acceptability of smoking

It is clear the industry simply researched the social cost issue to be able to create an instrument for lobbying. When the research of their consultants was finished, the next step for the industry was to decide which research could be used in its lobbying-strategy.

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 3 of many - A first glimpse at the activities and the names of all recruited members

overview of previous posts here

The tobacco industry wanted to recruit at least one economist per American state (explanation will follow). During the existence of the network, over 100 American economics professors were involved, but not all were very active in the network.

The industry called those shown below the ‘core group’. They all worked closely with the Tobacco Institute, and p.ex. followed a media-training program.

The Core Group

ROBERT D. TOLLISON (1942 - 2016)

Set up the network with consultant James M. Savarese

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• wrote/edited at least five pro-tobacco books
• engaged in media tours throughout the USA
• testified several times at political hearings
• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• attended several meetings of economists associations
• helped write with S. Fred Singer, a tobacco report for the Alexis De Tocqueville Institution
• also worked for British American Tobacco and as a consultant for dozens other industries

RICHARD E. WAGNER 

Richard E. Wagner

In support of the tobacco industry

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• wrote/edited at least five pro-tobacco books
• engaged in media tours all over the USA
• testified several times at political hearings
• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• attended several meetings of economists associations

DWIGHT R. LEE 

In support of the tobacco industry

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• testified at least 20 times at political hearings
• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• attended several meetings of economists associations

Dwight R. Lee

RICHARD S. HIGGINS 

In support of the tobacco industry

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• wrote a 'scientific' paper in support of the tobacco industry

kept low profile, probably because he wasn't a professor, but working at the FTC

Robert B. Ekelund Jr. 

ROBERT B. EKELUND JR.

In support of the tobacco industry

• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• attended several meetings of economists associations

MICHAEL L. DAVIS 

In support of the tobacco industry

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• participated in media tour
• attended several meetings of economists associations

GARY M. ANDERSON 

In support of the tobacco industry

• attended strategic meetings at the Tobacco Institute
• wrote numerous op-eds and 'scientific' papers
• attended several meetings of economists associations

The other economists:

The full list of network members is given in Appendix A (see bottom of this post). At any given moment in time, the industry wanted to 'own' at least one economist per state. As through time some economists dropped out in total 100+ professors have been active in the network. it is not always clear how they were recruited (see further chapters)

Before having a look at their activities, it is necessary to understand why the network was set up by the Tobacco Institute. The network did not pop up spontaneously, but was part of a very well defined plan. This will be the subject of the next posts.

Especially in the beginning years, James Savarese kept lists with all the economists recruited

Recruited tobacco economists, first page of  all recruited economists in the 50 US-states ( december 11, 1986)

As mentioned, through time the neames sometimes changed, because economists dropped out, moved to another state, were evaluated useless (see further), etc.

The industry closely monotored the activities of the network, p.ex. in this document from december 11, 1986 . Do notice they worked in well organised campains directed by the Tobacco Institute. All of them acted as lobbysists, not as academics expressing their opinions.

Appendix A - All identified members of the network 

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 2 of many

1. Over one hundred economists, led by core group

The economist network was set up by Robert D. Tollison of GeorgeMason University with the help of lobbyist/consultant James M. Savarese. Over time some 120 economists were active in the network although not all of them participated equally, nor did they all receive the same amount of funding for their lobbying.

The industry constantly evaluated the economists (see further). A core group was created in 1988 and it helped further refining the lobbying strategy:

A social cost committee of seven economists headed  y Jim Savarese and Bob Tollison is being formed. Others in the economist network may play a role researching and writing on this issue. However, this core group will create strategies and structure for a social cost program. The group will have its first meeting to begin implementing a strategy on February 1-2 in Washington.

This committee will be modeled after the economist network and will operate in a similar manner. The group will convene at least three times a year. A series of targeted brochures to various key audiences on the issue could be prepared for:- state legislators and staff
- federal legislators and staff
- academics
- media

Members of this core group, and their positions at the time, were

-      Robert D. Tollison, Ph.D. Director, Public Choice Center George Mason University 

-      Richard E. Wagner, Ph.D. Holbert Harris University Distinguished Professor George Mason University 

-      Dwight Lee, Ph.D. Professor, Department of Economics University of Georgia

-      Richard Higgins, Ph.D. Economist Washington Economic Research Consultants (Former Deputy Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission)

-     Robert Ekelund Jr., Ph.D. Lowder Professor of Economics Auburn University

-     Michael L. Davies

-     Gary Anderson, Ph.D. Professor, Department of Economics, California State University at Northridge

-      Bob Ebel, Ph.D. Director, Public Finance Program The Urban Institute

With the exception of Ebel, this core group would be responsible for running the network. In another 1988 document, James Savarese lists the core group, this time without Ebel, who does not reappear in the files, so he must have dropped out early.  

This core group worked closely with the Tobacco Institute including participating in strategic meetings and more.  Realistically, the other 100+ professors may be regarded as subcontractors of Savarese &Tollison. Nevertheless all network members also had direct contacts with the Tobacco Institute over time.

Core Group

The tobacco industry wanted to recruit at least one economist per American state (we'll explain why). During the existence of the network, over 100 American economics professors were involved. The industry called those shown below the ‘core group’. They all worked closely with the Tobacco Institute

We'll explore the activities of the economist during the next year or so, but it is clear the industry had a clear vision how to you use the economists:

In the next number of posts, we will see the industry did not just hire the economists, but always evaluated them for effectiveness