Corrupted 120+ member tobacco professors network, part 29: embarrassing GSA-letters

Overview of previous posts here

Content of the GSA-letters

John F. Militello

John F. Militello sent his letter July 7, 1986. He wrote

That's not exactly the truth: February 25, 1986 James Savarese sent this letter to the Tobacco Institute during the ongoing Chase op-ed campaign

Millitello's GSA letter was part of an organized campaign. James Savarese wrote a handy overview of theactivities each network economist was involved with until 1986 Militello's activities were listed as follows:

Clearly, the GSA letter was not an effort of private citizen.

Arthur C. Mead

Arthur C. Mead's letter is somewhat bizarre

This is embarrassing 

J.J. Boddewyn

J.J. Boddewyn' text is what one would expect to read from a free market professor: freedom, freedom, freedom

Boddewyn's last paragraph on enforcement is one-sided: if there would be something like a right to smoke at the work floor, this would imply the need of new regulation to enforce this right. . .

Morgan Reynolds

In 1979 the US Surgeon General concluded ETS is harmful. Reynolds still denied this:

Like all the network economists, Reynolds used one sided arguments like

Reynolds (and all the other economists) ignored facts like buildings will have to be painted less, there will be less economic loss from smoking related illnesses etc. Telling a one sided tale is not typical of economists, the standard description of whom is that there is no such thing as a one handed economist, because they always say on the one hand and on the other.

Reynolds again:

Following Reynolds logic, employers would not have a problem to pay that extra amount of money as they now could decrease the salary of non-smokers. After all, their workings conditions improved, meaning -following his logic- after a ban they suddenly are being overpaid...

Cecil Bohanon

Cecil Bohanon et al. use a weird analogy

Five people signed this crap. 

Allen Dalton

Allen Dalton clearly has a full understanding of the word 'addiction', as his letter proves

(do read his entire letter, it is bewildering)

1.1.1.7     Denying health Risks

Morgan Reynolds was not the only one of the economists to deny the health risks of ETS. S. Charles Maurice et al wrote:

The 120+ corrupted tobacco economists network - Part 22 of many

Overview of previous posts here

Robert C. McMahon & Dennis Logue

The letters written by Dennis M. Dyer show the contacts with the economists were not left to Savarese alone (he received a copy of the letter though). Dyer described how the economists were asked to participate: the industry never said 'defend this crap'. Instead they sent the economists papers written by the industry, asking the economists if they would be willing to defend it. All the economists knew they would receive money if they said yes. But is seems they always had the option to say 'no' if they did not feel comfortable defending something. Of course, too many no's probably would get them removed from the network.

Lee J. Alston at the time was in Australia, but wrote hestill was interested in working with the Tobacco Institute. Alston was not a very active member. His letter shows that the Tobacco Institute did have direct contact with everyone the network, not just the core group of economists.

A follow up memorandum shows Savarese had identified 6 possible new economists to work as consultants, and had effectively recruited and contacted SimonRottenberg. Rottenberg received the same letter as above acouple of months later, yet it seems Rottenberg never did much for the tobacco industry. But it makes one wonder where Rottenberg's articles on the costs of transportation and the costs of medicine came from. Not exactly two fields that are related to each other. Rottenberg would also edit a book for the Independent Institute.

Some of the economists must have replied to Dyer's letter. 

This is corruption, nothing less.

More proof that some of the economists were for sale is found in another passage in the same letter:

Even though he realized the work he defended at a testimony was seriously flawed, Logue decided to defend it. . .

The tobacco economists network - or how the Tobacco Institute recruited over 100 American economics professors. Part 17 of many

Overview of previous posts here

The industry keeps evaluating

The industry kept evaluating for effectiveness

Full list of remarks:

• Prof Dominick Armentano — "Yes: Contacted, make good witness"
• Prof Summer LaCroix — "Yes: if needed in Hawaii"
• Prof Allan Dalton — "Yes: Good Witness"
• Prof Fred McChesney — "No Contact. Reported to be OK and could be used in future.
• Prof Cecil Bohanon — "Should be replaced by listed Indiana Economist, Prof. James A Papke"
• Prof Thomas Pogue — "Yes, Could be outstanding."
• Prof Robert McMahon — "Yes: Creditable witness and one-on-one contact."
• Pro Greg Neihaus — "Yes, outstanding witness"
• Prof Raymond Raab — "Yes: Outstanding"
• Prof Terry Anderson — "Yes, Good Witness"
• Prof Terry Logue — "Yes: Outstanding witness"
• Prof Kenneth Greene — "Yes: Only in particular situations with controlled information."
• Prof Cliff Dobitz — "No contact: State not lend itself to Economic witness use."
• Prof Richard Vedder — "No - Conflict minimizes effectiveness"
• Prof William Mitchell — "Yes, Good witness"
• Prof Ann Harper-Fender — "No contact - out of country, will contact in June.
• Prof Arthur Mead— "Yes: Good witness"
• Prof Dennis Hein — "Contact sometimes back; will probably be good witness and usable in 1988.
• Dr Mark Schmitz — "Washington — No"
• Dr Dennis Chinn — "Washington —Yes, Excellent"

PR-firm Ogilvy and Mather and James M. Savarese  explain

In order to make the most of the new opportunities for the economist network, several factors had to be taken into consideration

(...)

As effectiveness was everything, the industry even asked Savarese to replacesome economists because they. . . lived in the wrong city.