The 120+ corrupted tobacco economists network - Part 22 of many

Overview of previous posts here

Robert C. McMahon & Dennis Logue

The letters written by Dennis M. Dyer show the contacts with the economists were not left to Savarese alone (he received a copy of the letter though). Dyer described how the economists were asked to participate: the industry never said 'defend this crap'. Instead they sent the economists papers written by the industry, asking the economists if they would be willing to defend it. All the economists knew they would receive money if they said yes. But is seems they always had the option to say 'no' if they did not feel comfortable defending something. Of course, too many no's probably would get them removed from the network.

Lee J. Alston at the time was in Australia, but wrote hestill was interested in working with the Tobacco Institute. Alston was not a very active member. His letter shows that the Tobacco Institute did have direct contact with everyone the network, not just the core group of economists.

A follow up memorandum shows Savarese had identified 6 possible new economists to work as consultants, and had effectively recruited and contacted SimonRottenberg. Rottenberg received the same letter as above acouple of months later, yet it seems Rottenberg never did much for the tobacco industry. But it makes one wonder where Rottenberg's articles on the costs of transportation and the costs of medicine came from. Not exactly two fields that are related to each other. Rottenberg would also edit a book for the Independent Institute.

Some of the economists must have replied to Dyer's letter. 

This is corruption, nothing less.

More proof that some of the economists were for sale is found in another passage in the same letter:

Even though he realized the work he defended at a testimony was seriously flawed, Logue decided to defend it. . .

Secret Tobacco economists network, Part 13 : political hearings and questionable ethics

Overview of previous posts here

Evaluating the witnesses

The industry evaluated the performance of the economists for effectiveness. The Tobacco Institute wanted to know if it would be good to use them again for future hearings, so it sent out questionnaires to its field agents to answer questions like

The same document also talks about other active programs, like Economic Impact studies produced by the Tobacco Institute (studies written to claim taxing the tobacco industry would have a negative impact), the scientific witness program and the helping youth decide program.

The August 1986 Field staff evaluation ofresources describes how the regional tobacco vice-presidents (RVP) thought the economists performed at the testimonies (emphasis added)

A memo from Susan Stuntz describes how the field lobbyists complained that the recruited economists were too conservative, making it difficult reaching liberal legislators. Stuntz dismissed this criticism

Of course, the economist were paid for their testimony

Still, being a good witness did not mean the economists were sure they would be asked for other output. This probably explains why the Savarese "tax hearing readiness" lists do not match with the activities of all economists in the network: economist not suited for testimony still benefitted the industry, as these economists were still useful when writing op-eds (and vice versa).